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Ideological Consistency and Contextual Adaptation
U.S. Peace Movement Emotional Work Before and After 9/11

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The authors examine how the U.S. peace movement responded to the Bush administration’s attempts to generate and capitalize on a heightened sense of threat after the 9/11 attacks. Longitudinal analysis of statements by U.S. peace movement organizations issued before and after 9/11 indicates that the movement’s discourse is both ideologically consistent and contextually adaptive. In each period, movement discourse highlighted the U.S. government as a source of threat and people living outside of the United States as the targets of that threat. Nonetheless, the movement’s discourse changed significantly in the exacerbated climate of fear in the first 4 months after the 9/11 attacks and then began to revert to pre-9/11 patterns during the Iraq War when the salience of threat declined. This research significantly advances knowledge of social movement discourse by establishing that ideological consistency and contextual adaptation are not mutually exclusive, by highlighting the contextual and dialogical factors that encourage certain types of movement responses to dominant discourses, and by explaining the role of emotional work in mobilizing dissent.

Keywords: social movements; peace movement; discourse; emotions; September 11; United States of America

A climate of fear existed in the United States prior to September 11, 2001 (Altheide, 2002; Glassner, 1999). Although the source of the threat varied—tainted food, kidnappings, child molestation, identity theft—the message sent out by the mainstream media on a daily basis was loud and clear. Danger is everywhere. Thus, it is more accurate to state that the paramilitary attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon exacerbated rather than created a climate of fear.

Yet it is precisely this preexisting climate that explains the potent effects of the attacks on the collective psyche of the public. The placement of the United States as the world’s lone military superpower accorded a false sense of insularity from
attack. The events of 9/11 snatched away this security blanket. The national security breach reinforced an already acute sense of domestic threat to personal safety.

The Bush administration exploited this climate to legitimate its policies, using the threat of further attacks to rally support for a permanent war economy, aggressive military retaliation, preemptive attacks abroad, and civil liberty suppression at home. Our analysis of 76 statements by President Bush in the first 3 months after 9/11 reveals that “terrorist” or “terrorists” appeared more frequently than any other terminology coded (Maney, Coy, & Woehrle, 2008). In a televised address on November 8, 2001, President Bush used threat language to generate support for repressive legislation and for invading Afghanistan:

> Our nation faces a threat to our freedoms and the stakes could not be higher. We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill—kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We’ve seen that type of hate before—and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it.

President Bush’s construction of the events of 9/11 not only heightened threat salience but also strengthened public support for war and repression (Glassner, 2004).

Given this context, the U.S. peace movement organizations (PMOs) found themselves in a difficult emotional climate. The emotional climate not only facilitated the mobilization of consensus by power holders but also hindered the mobilization of dissent. In a nationwide telephone survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in early October 2001, 25% of 951 respondents answering the question indicated that Americans who oppose taking military action should not be allowed to carry out peaceful protest rallies. Doubting the effectiveness of the state’s response to a threat increases the sense of vulnerability that many in the general public are trying to quell within themselves. Questioning the sources and targets of the threat effectively invalidates the emotional state of many citizens. By not supporting the state’s efforts to protect the nation and by downplaying the threat, dissidents become objects of fear as well as threatening subjects as they are lumped together with the “enemy” (Neilson, 2004).

We examine how U.S. peace movement responded to the Bush administration’s attempts to generate and capitalize on a heightened sense of threat prevailing after 9/11 to increase support for its policies. Did the movement alter its discourse or did its messages remain consistent with those prominently featured in past conflicts? If the discourse changed, how did it change and why? Were these changes temporary

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or have they persisted? The answers advance social movement theory by shedding light on the degree of continuity and change in social movement discourse, contextual and dialogical factors that encourage certain movement responses to dominant discourses, and the role of emotional work in mobilizing dissent.

A longitudinal analysis of statements issued by PMOs before and after 9/11 indicates both ideological adherence and contextual adaptation. In all five conflict periods, PMOs directly challenged the dominant discourse more than they harnessed it. Movement discourse consistently highlighted the U.S. government as a source of threat and people living outside of the United States as the targets of that threat. At the same time, the peace movement altered its discourses in response to a heightened sense of threat in the first 4 months after the 9/11 attacks. Compared to previous conflict periods, PMOs were more likely to address threats (in particular threats to persons inside the United States) and to harness the dominant discourse surrounding threat. However, movement discourse during the first 2 years of the Iraq War began to return to pre-9/11 patterns. We argue that the passage of time without a subsequent attack, the hyper-use and overextension of threat by the Bush administration, and increasingly critical media coverage created a new emotional climate that encouraged the peace movement to write less about threats and to directly challenge the dominant discourse and its reliance on threats as a tool of mass manipulation.

**Theory**

**Emotional Components of Hegemony and Resistance**

Well-publicized events constructed as threatening the physical safety of the general public are likely to generate strong emotional responses, ranging from fear and anger to grief and pain. In this context, power holders can strengthen their legitimacy by emphasizing threats and linking the reduction of threats to their rule and policies. Strong emotions are appropriated and translated into both the pragmatic need and moral obligation to support power holders and their policies (Aminzade & McAdam, 2001). Because of power holders’ institutionally privileged access to mass communications, their messages disproportionately influence the general public. We see this phenomenon as an example of hegemony—a cultural process that legitimates the rule and policies of power holders (Gramsci, 1971; Anderson, 1976; Williams, 1982). This particular example of hegemony highlights the importance of emotional work in systemic reproduction.

Movements operate in a discursive environment largely defined by powerful opponents (Whittier, 2001; Neilson, 2004) and are structurally ill equipped to counteract the emotional components of hegemony. A lack of resources, prestige, and institutional control compounds the credibility deficit produced by a relative lack of favorable mass media coverage. This lack of credibility pressures movements to make two responses. First, they must present their bona fides through a “credentialing
process” (Coy & Woehrle, 1996). Second, they devote substantially greater amounts of their text to providing evidence in support of their claims (Maney, Coy, & Woehrle, 2009). These emphases take text, time, and energy away from emotional work. Even if oppositional discourses emphasized emotions, power holders can present that emphasis in ways that undermine the already limited credibility of challengers (Einwohner, 1999).

We assert that activists have four main options available in responding to the emotional components of hegemony: (a) ignore the dominant discourse, (b) challenge the dominant discourse, (c) harness the dominant discourse, or (d) mix challenging and harnessing responses. Each response poses dilemmas for social movements. First, activists may decide not to stoke the emotional fire and avoid discussing threats altogether. The movement’s discourse becomes a model of an alternative emotional world devoid of specific emotions used to legitimate the status quo. Such a strategy, however, will not prevent power holders from capitalizing on and reinforcing a deep sense of threat among the general public.

Second, some activists conclude that the movement must try to eliminate the emotional underpinnings of an oppressive system. Accordingly, they choose to directly challenge the emotional work of power holders. Challenges involve efforts to decouple or even reverse positive relationships between the dominant discourse and the emotional worlds of potential constituents. For instance, activists can argue that the threat presented by power holders is not real and, therefore, there is nothing to fear. Assertions of mass manipulation encourage the general public to cast a critical eye on the emotional work of power holders. An even more ambitious project is to reverse the sources and targets of threat constructed by the dominant discourse. Instead of power holders providing effective responses to threats, challenging discourses present power holders and their policies as either the causes of the threat or “the real threat” to the public. Those who are typically vilified and presented as threats by the dominant discourse are recast as being the most threatened and having the most to fear.

Such challenges to the dominant discourse are both strategic and expressive. They try to effect long-term cultural change by producing oppositional knowledge and stimulating oppositional consciousness (e.g., Coy & Woehrle, 1996; Carroll & Ratner, 2001; Mansbridge, 2001; Woehrle, & Maney, 2008b). However, empirical research indicates that it is rare for movements to succeed in convincing those heavily socialized by the dominant discourse to reject their previous prognostic and diagnostic attributions (Snow & Benford, 1988). To the extent that the dominant discourse harmonizes itself with the emotional worlds of the general public, direct challenges to it are likely to evoke negative reactions such as incomprehension, ridicule, and resentment. Few like to be told that what they are feeling is wrong. This is particularly the case during moments of heightened anxiety and fear, when the public often looks for comfort in soothing discourses that affirm existing world-views and self-esteem (Konty, Duell, & Joireman, 2004). Even if some of the public embraces the challenge, power holders can co-opt and rework elements of the movement discourse to restore the legitimacy of their policies (e.g., Naples, 2002).
Third, activists can appropriate or harness the emotional work of the dominant discourse to support oppositional claims (Maney, Woehrle, & Coy, 2005). As a discursive strategy, harnessing the dominant discourse constitutes a type of “emotional jiu-jitsu,” whereby rather than trying to block the potency of authoritative language and ideas, activists embrace the weight of these potencies to go on the discursive offensive. Oppositional discourse mirrors the dominant discourse—the symbolic contents are the same but the political implications are reversed. The threat is acknowledged as being real. However, it is asserted that the policy agenda of power holders will only deepen the threat and jeopardize what most people value most. Rather than trying to defuse emotions stirred by the dominant discourse, activists affirm the validity of these feelings and translate them into moral obligations or pragmatic reasons to oppose power holders and their policies.

Although harnessing the emotional work of power holders appears to be practical and effective, it also poses dilemmas for activists (Woehrle, Coy, & Maney 2008). Harnessing the dominant discourse may inadvertently fuel hegemony by increasing the potency of emotions inextricably linked in the popular psyche with existing social relations (Ku, 2001). In addition, activists who harness the dominant discourse are vulnerable to allegations of co-optation by those who have constructed their oppositional identities in emotional contradistinction to it (e.g., Coles, 1999).

Fourth, both intentionally and unintentionally, for expressive and strategic reasons, activists will fashion variegated and multivalent messages. These messages will emotionally mirror some aspects of the dominant discourse and challenge others. Although acknowledging the likelihood of activists engaging in responses consistent with their longstanding values, beliefs, and commitments, we also theorize that certain contextual factors orient movements toward either challenging or harnessing responses.

**Contextualizing the Emotional Work of Movements**

Despite the recognition that movement discourses are driven by specific socio-cultural contexts (Steinberg, 1999), researchers have yet to address why different contexts make certain responses to dominant discourses more or less likely. As a consequence, little is known about why a movement ignores, challenges, or harnesses the emotional work of power holders more during one historical moment than another. Our analysis addresses this void.

We argue that movements adapt their discourses in response to mass media constructions of issues and events. The newsworthiness of an event is typically related to its degree of novelty, deviance, conflict, the number of people affected and the magnitude of the effect, proximity, timeliness, and visibility (Oliver & Maney, 2000). “Newsworthy” issues and events often receive sensationalized coverage intended to elicit strong emotional reactions (Hertog & McLeod, 1995). The objective is not to assist the audience in analyzing an event but rather to fascinate, intrigue, or shock. In sensationalist coverage of conflicts, journalists typically emphasize threats to the...
audience. The cause for fear is repeated ad nauseam and isolated incidents are presented as trends (Glassner, 2004).

The nature of the constructed sources and targets of the threat critically affect social movement discourse. When external actors are presented as the source of the threat and internal actors are the target, the mediated event is likely to elicit a strong sense of personal threat in the audience and reinforce the potency of the dominant discourse. In these cases, we expect oppositional movements to harness the emotional work of power holders to a greater extent than they would otherwise. Activists are not immune from the influences of the media. Appropriation of emotional elements of the dominant discourse, therefore, could be a transparent expression of emotions experienced by activists. More strategic activists may recognize that a challenging response would not only limit the mass appeal of the movement but likely trigger backlash against it. As a consequence, mobilizing dissent requires recognizing that the emotional state of potential supporters is heavily influenced by the dominant discourse.

Power holders do not always benefit from sensationalized media coverage. On occasion, the mainstream media present power holders as the source of the threat (e.g., Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). We expect social movements to recognize the waning potency of the dominant discourse and seek to further undermine it through challenging responses. In so doing, a movement can affirm the feelings and beliefs of existing adherents, expand its membership, and rapidly raise oppositional consciousness within the general public.

It is ironic that because the dynamics of discursive contention are so lopsided, they tend to lead to the erosion of the potency of the dominant discourse over time. Sensationalized media coverage encourages power holders to extend the language of threat to garner support for a wide range of policy agenda items. This eventually exposes the dominant discourse to challenges on the grounds of empirical credibility and experiential commensurability (Snow & Benford, 1992). Along with growing skepticism, emotional fatigue from the threat-blitz contributes to reduced feelings of endangerment (Snow & Corrigall-Brown, 2004). In this context, challenges to the emotional work of power holders are more likely to strike a responsive chord with mass audiences. As the salience of threat diminishes, the movement can move away from threat in its discourse, in particular at the level of personal experience. To the extent that threat is addressed, it is challenged as a tool of mass political manipulation. The movement more emphatically reconstructs the sources and targets of threat from external to internal sources and from internal to external targets.

**Method**

Assessing our propositions with regard to contextual factors that shape movement discourse requires longitudinal data and analysis. Accordingly, we collected
statements issued by U.S. PMOs during five conflict periods: the Gulf War, the 1998 Northern Iraq “no fly zone” bombings, the 1999 NATO bombings of Kosovo, the first 4 months after the 9/11 attacks (including the Afghanistan war), and the first 2 years of the Iraq War. The breadth of the data set enables us to compare U.S. peace movement discourse before and after 9/11.

The data consist of press releases, printed statements, editorials, and public calls to action issued in the name of the organization as a whole (usually by the national office). The collected statements not only represent the public face and voice of the social movement organization, but they also are arguably the best record of an organization’s evolving official positions. Such statements provide a tangible representation of the organization’s discourses and, as such, can be effectively used in data analysis.

Controlling for differences in discourse across organizations requires us to limit our comparison of pre-9/11 versus post-9/11 discourses to five PMOs issuing statements in all five conflict periods: The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), Pax Christi, Peace Action, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). To gain greater confidence in the external validity of our conclusions, we also compared statements issued by 10 PMOs during the first 4 months after 9/11 with statements issued during the first 2 years of the Iraq War. The post-9/11 analysis includes additional documents from the following five PMOs: the Black Radical Congress, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), New York City Labor Against the War, Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND), and War Resisters League.

With the assistance of N-Vivo software, we coded multiple thematic propositions as recording units of analysis. We analyzed the frequency of the propositions within individual paragraphs, which served as the context unit. To conduct meaningful comparisons of coding frequencies despite differences in volume of statements per organization, we created a series of organizational and longitudinal weights based on the number of words produced and the average number of words per paragraph.

Our analysis focuses on three dimensions of peace movement discourse: (a) the volume of threat-related discourse; (b) the proportion of different types of responses to the dominant constructions of threat (i.e., whether they challenged or harnessed the threat); and (c) prevailing constructions of targets of threat (i.e., whether they were inside or outside of the United States). Given our focus on the peace movement’s response to the dominant discourse of threat after 9/11, we limit our analysis to a set of 33 threat-related codes. We define threat-related codes as codes where something is presented or rejected as a threat to the physical, emotional, or economic well-being of someone. To ascertain the relative proportion of different types of responses to the dominant discourse, we created two separate bundles of codes: one consisting of codes challenging the threats constructed by the dominant discourse and the other consisting of codes harnessing the threats constructed by the dominant discourse. To explore possible variations in the constructed targets of threat, we also
created separate bundles for codes related to threats to persons living inside the United States and to threats to persons living outside the United States.

Our research design lends itself to clear conclusions concerning the character of movement discourse. On one hand, little variation in the amount of threat discourse, the relative emphasis on challenging and harnessing responses, and the constructed sources and targets of the threat across conflicts would highlight ideological consistency in peace movement discourse. On the other hand, variations across conflict periods would highlight the adaptive character of peace movement discourses.

Results

The findings support our expectations that social movement discourses demonstrate both ideological consistency and contextual adaptation. We start with our findings concerning the amount of threat discourse by the U.S. peace movement and then examine different types of responses to threats constructed by the dominant discourse.

Volume of Threat Discourse

Table 1 presents the relative frequencies of passages containing threat discourse in five conflict periods. In terms of ideological adherence, PMOs in all periods (including 9/11) collectively emphasized threats to persons outside the United States more than threats to persons inside the United States. As such, peace movement discourse challenges the logic of a dominant nationalist discourse that places a higher value on the rights and lives of U.S. citizens. Statements frequently emphasized civilian casualties and other human costs to those in militarily invaded societies. The U.S. government was widely criticized for failing to acknowledge the loss of lives resulting from its decisions. For example, during the Gulf War, the WILPF (August 1991) wrote, “According to President Bush and Congress, the U.S. has never had any quarrel with the Iraqi people. Yet those most afflicted and endangered by the present post-war crisis, and by the threat of renewed U.S. attacks, are innocent Iraqi civilians.” During the Iraq War, AFSC (December 2003) echoed these sentiments: “In Iraq, the American occupiers do not even report the number of civilian dead. What does this say about the value given to these lives?” In the process of shifting the sources and targets of threat, the movement’s discourse has consistently humanized those who are either vilified as the enemy or rendered invisible in the dominant discourse.

At the same time, Table 1 makes clear that the peace movement varied the degree of threat discourse across conflict periods. Difference of means tests indicate that the volume of threats constructed during the first 4 months after 9/11 were significantly greater than during the other four conflict periods. The table also supports our explanation for this increase as a response to a climate of fear fueled by media and
Table 1
Amount of Threat Discourse by Conflict Period and Target of Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Period</th>
<th>Target of Threat</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Column %</th>
<th>$t$ Statistic (df)</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Column %</th>
<th>$t$ Statistic (df)</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Column %</th>
<th>$t$ Statistic (df)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Any Person</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td></td>
<td>188.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>$-1.25$ (153)</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>$-0.95$ (78)</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>$-0.72$ (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td>166.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>$-2.12^*$ (153)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>$-1.06$ (78)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>$-2.12^*$ (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosova/o</td>
<td></td>
<td>293.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>$0.30$ (153)</td>
<td>162.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>$0.91$ (78)</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>$1.22$ (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>425.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>$2.46^*$ (153)</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>$0.67$ (78)</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>$3.14^{**}$ (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td></td>
<td>315.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>$0.61$ (153)</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>$0.42$ (78)</td>
<td>115.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>$1.07$ (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1388.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$0.61$ (153)</td>
<td>717.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$0.42$ (78)</td>
<td>401.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>$1.07$ (63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data weighted to control for differences in the number of words and average paragraph size between organizations and across conflict periods. Only statements from the five peace movement organizations issuing statements in all five conflict periods included. Threat to any person bundle includes codes that frequently addressed threats to persons both inside and outside the United States.

$p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001$ of $t$-value for two-tailed difference of means test comparing the frequencies of codes during the conflict period with the frequencies for the other four conflict periods.
power holders’ discourses. What makes the 9/11 period discourse exceptional is its emphasis on threats to persons inside the United States.

Our analysis suggests that this internal emphasis was both expressive and strategic. On one hand, activists wrote about their own threat-related feelings. Immediately following the attacks, the FOR (September 11, 2001) wrote, “With shocking suddenness we find ourselves in the position of so many in the world who live in fear and senseless violence. We are humbled by our vulnerability.” At the same time, PMOs were also aware of the ways that these threat-related feelings were being used to mobilize support for policies that they opposed. A few months after the attack, the FOR (November 15, 2001) stated:

The U.S. is awash in patriotism. It is a natural impulse to look for support in the wider community when there is widespread grief, mourning, fear, and rage in the face of the heinous events of September 11. . . . But there is great danger when these appropriate feelings and actions get channeled into an uncritical call to arms, massive military appropriations, and a jingoism that harms the safety and well-being of our Muslim and Middle Eastern neighbors here at home, and wages war abroad.

Responding to the emotional work of power holders, PMOs devoted substantial amounts of text to addressing threats to the U.S. public.

Did the possibility of another attack on U.S. soil mean that a heightened emphasis on threat has become a permanent feature of peace movement discourse? Two-tailed difference of means tests (analysis not shown) do not indicate a significant difference in the amount of threat-code frequencies between the 9/11 period and the Iraq War period. Nonetheless, PMOs devoted roughly half as much attention to addressing threats to persons inside the United States during the Iraq War period compared with the 9/11 period. The volume of threat discourse during the Iraq War is more comparable with the Kosova/o conflict (see Table 1). The decline suggests an attempt by PMOs to avoid feeding into a climate of fear being fostered by power holders and the media. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, the WILPF (November 18, 2003) wrote that “the Administration’s continuing cultivation of fear to justify a U.S. invasion of Iraq has overwhelmed reason and decency in political decision-making and the media in our country.”

In the absence of a subsequent attack on the United States and with increased recognition that Iraq did not, in fact, possess weapons of mass destruction, peace movement discourse during the first 2 years of the Iraq War reflected and reinforced a declining sense of threat within the general public. In April 2003, Peace Action called for “a movement for a new foreign policy based on human rights and democracy, reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and cooperation with the world community.” By September, the same PMO ran an advertising campaign with the headline “We Found the Weapons of Mass Destruction. They’re in the President’s Budget” (Peace Action, September 2, 2003). Groups often referred to debunking articles in newspapers of record. WAND, for example, put a link on its Web site to a Washington Post article indicating that an Iraqi nuclear weapons program

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“amounted to wishful thinking” (January 13, 2004). As evidence of human rights violations in Iraq by U.S. forces mounted, movement discourse started to revert to its traditionally predominant emphasis on threats to persons outside the United States posed by the government’s foreign policies.

### Responses to the Dominant Discourse

Table 2 lists the weighted frequencies of two code bundles by conflict period and by target of threat. One bundle sums code frequencies for challenges to the dominant discourse of threat. The other bundle sums the code frequencies for instances where the dominant discourse is harnessed. As with the volume of threat discourse, the peace movement’s response to the dominant discourse of threat has exhibited both ideologically adherent and contextually adaptive qualities.

In all five conflict periods, including the 4 months after 9/11, PMOs challenged the dominant discourse of threat more than they harnessed it. This relationship held even when controlling for the target of the threat. In particular, the military industrial complex was consistently presented as encouraging armed responses to international conflicts. The following response by Pax Christi (May 4, 1999) to the NATO bombings of Serbia is representative:

> For the past nine years, a highly successful nonviolent campaign was waged by the people of Kosova. . . . Why was NATO so quick to spend $60 million per day on a military effort without ever thinking of using those funds to support a nonviolent resolution to the conflict?

The WILPF’s (March 26, 1999) answer to Pax Christi’s question is also typical: “The interests of U.S. arms manufacturers are intimately tied to the expansion of NATO as the policeman of the European continent and beyond.”

A proximity text search revealed that nearly a third (30.9%) of all the documents discussing militarism also contained references to a cycle of violence. In each period, PMOs frequently argued that armed responses to conflict would contribute to an escalating spiral of violence that would present a threat either to civilians in invaded societies or to the general public in the United States. For example, just prior to the bombings of northern Iraq by the Clinton administration, Peace Action (November 13, 1998) warned that the attacks “could incite retribution and escalate tensions in the Middle East.” The highest concentration of challenges was in the 4 months following September 11th. The following passage by the FOR (December 20, 2001) links a cycle of violence to militarization:

> The criminal acts of September 11 were met with a call to arms by the U.S. In the name of fighting terrorism, an undeclared war on Afghanistan was begun, with the growing likelihood that the U.S. will enlarge this war in up to forty countries. At home this has
meant the eroding of our constitutional freedoms, the further enriching of the wealthiest individuals and corporations in our country, and an even greater expansion of the role of the military in U.S. society.

PMOs consistently presented the U.S. government’s use of organized violence as the chief threat to the well-being of ordinary people both at home and abroad. By challenging the real politick assumption that security can be achieved through superior military force, peace movement discourse can truly be considered ideological.

Table 2
Responses to Dominant Discourse by Conflict Period and Target of Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of Threat</th>
<th>Any Person</th>
<th>Persons Outside United States</th>
<th>Persons Inside United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenging Freq. (Row %) (Column %)</td>
<td>Harnessing Freq. (Row %) (Column %)</td>
<td>Challenging Freq. (Row %) (Column %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>160.5 (88.7)</td>
<td>20.5 (11.3)</td>
<td>105.2 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.6)</td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td>(14.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq 1998</td>
<td>117.3 (92.2)</td>
<td>10.0 (7.8)</td>
<td>100.0 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.4)</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(13.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosova/o</td>
<td>230.9 (82.5)</td>
<td>48.9 (17.5)</td>
<td>162.9 (83.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22.4)</td>
<td>(17.8)</td>
<td>(22.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>288.6 (69.5)</td>
<td>126.6* (30.5)</td>
<td>180.0 (98.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28.1)</td>
<td>(46.1)</td>
<td>(25.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>231.3 (77.1)</td>
<td>68.5 (22.9)</td>
<td>169.5 (98.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22.5)</td>
<td>(25.0)</td>
<td>(23.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1028.6 (78.9)</td>
<td>274.6 (21.1)</td>
<td>717.6 (95.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data weighted to control for differences in the number of words and average paragraph size between organizations and across conflict periods. Statements from the five peace movement organizations issuing statements in all five conflict periods included. Threat to any person bundle includes codes that frequently addressed threats to persons both inside and outside the United States.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 of the F statistic for a one-way analysis of variance comparing the weighted frequencies for each code in the bundle during the conflict period with the weighted frequencies for the four other conflict periods.
While demonstrating adherence to certain language and ideas, Table 2 also reveals shifts across conflict periods in the movement’s response to the dominant discourse. The PMOs harnessed the dominant discourse of threat more during the 9/11 period than during any other conflict period. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that there was a significant main effect for the 9/11 period when examining all harnessing codes, $F(1, 33) = 6.57$. Kosovar/o was the only other conflict period that achieved significance as a predictor of more or less than average challenging or harnessing responses. The primary difference between the 9/11 period and other conflict periods lay in the unusually high degree of harnessing of threats to persons inside the United States as constructed by the dominant discourse. A one-way ANOVA indicates an even stronger effect for the period with regard to domestic targets, $F(1, 23) = 11.51$.

The September 11 attacks activated dominant emotional norms governing mourning and unleashed a torrent of strong emotional responses from most living in the United States, including movement activists. Collectively, PMOs repeatedly condemned acts of terror by paramilitary organizations and expressed sympathy for the victims, thereby mirroring the sentiments of the dominant discourse even as they turned these sentiments toward critical perspectives on existing structures and policies. It is notable that this discourse was virtually absent from the other four conflict periods. All 10 groups issued sharply worded judgments on the attacks and used emotion-laden language, including “despicable,” “horrific,” “traumatic,” “horrendous,” “indescribable suffering,” “terrible,” “anger,” “shock,” “mourning,” and the “deepest grief imaginable.” The PMOs also commonly asked what these emotions should lead to and what kinds of actions they ought to result in for individual citizens and for the government as well. The PMOs used emotion words as “carriers” to link movement policy critiques and long-held oppositional ideas to widely shared public experiences. For example, anger about the attacks was expressed and affirmed but then redirected toward U.S. government policies perceived to be contributing to the causes of the attacks. Empathy for the World Trade Center victims was embraced but also redirected so that it might lead to an unaccustomed “humility” on the part of Americans and to a rare “solidarity” with those who live their entire lives in violence zones. The PMOs argued that a lesson of 9/11 is that no one is beyond the reach of retaliatory violence. This lesson, in turn, served as a segue to wide-ranging critiques of U.S. government unilateralism, weapons sales, foreign aid, and development policies.

PMOs also frequently harnessed civil liberties as a cherished national principle to present war and political repression as threats to the general public. The frequency of paragraphs containing civil liberties discourse during the 9/11 period was more than 15 times higher than the average for the three previous conflict periods. PMOs argued that the ultimate threat to national security was not another terrorist attack but the loss of civil liberties. The WILPF (November 20, 2001) urged Congress to “reject proposals which threaten the constitutional freedoms protecting our country’s democratic aspirations.” PMOs anchored their discourse squarely in the American...
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tradition of constitutionalism and the importance of preserving civil liberties. They insisted that the job of the true patriot was to uphold the Bill of Rights.

We expected that a decline in the salience of threat to the U.S. public following the invasion of Iraq would lead to fewer harnessing responses. Using statements collected from 10 PMOs, we compared the aggregated weighted frequencies of codes in the challenging and harnessing code bundles for the 9/11 period with the aggregated weighted frequencies for these code bundles in the Iraq War period. Table 3 presents the findings. Column percentages indicate that PMOs devoted roughly half as much emphasis to harnessing threats during the Iraq War period compared with the 9/11 period. Row percentages also show a shift toward a greater relative emphasis on challenging responses during the Iraq War compared with 9/11. The frequency of challenging versus harnessing responses differed significantly by period, $X^2(1, N = 2661) = 42.85, p < .001$. This significant shift in response to the dominant discourse across a relatively short period of time highlights the adaptive nature of peace movement discourse.

We attribute the shift in the emotional climate during the Iraq War, in part, to the dynamics and outcomes of discursive contention between the Bush administration

### Table 3
Responses to Dominant Discourse by Conflict Period and Target of Threat (9/11 and Iraq War conflict periods only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of Threat</th>
<th>Any Person</th>
<th>Persons Outside United States</th>
<th>Persons Inside United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Challenging</td>
<td>Harnessing</td>
<td>Challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freq. (Row %)</td>
<td>Freq. (Row %)</td>
<td>Freq. (Row %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Period</td>
<td>(Column %)</td>
<td>(Column %)</td>
<td>(Column %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>1010.8</td>
<td>501.7</td>
<td>603.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(66.8)</td>
<td>(33.2)</td>
<td>(98.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(52.9)</td>
<td>(66.9)</td>
<td>(49.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>899.8</td>
<td>248.5</td>
<td>611.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(78.4)</td>
<td>(21.6)</td>
<td>(98.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47.1)</td>
<td>(33.1)</td>
<td>(50.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1910.6</td>
<td>750.1</td>
<td>1215.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(71.8)</td>
<td>(28.2)</td>
<td>(98.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data weighted to control for differences in the number of words and average paragraph size between organizations and across conflict periods. Statements from the 10 peace movement organizations issuing statements in both conflict periods included. Threat to any person bundle includes codes that frequently addressed threats to persons both inside and outside the United States.
and the peace movement as mediated by the mainstream media. Recognizing the potency of its discourse on 9/11 and the “war on terror,” the Bush administration extended this discourse to its Iraq policy (Alterman, 2004). Although securing an initial groundswell of support for a military invasion of Iraq, this extension unwittingly provided the peace movement with opportunities to weaken hegemony by undermining the potency of the dominant discourse. PMOs exploited this opening by frequently challenging the language and assumptions of a preemptive strike. For instance, Peace Action (September 2002) described the policy as being based on maybe’s, might’s, and could’s, and Iraq seems to be the first target on everybody’s mind. Maybe Iraq has a nuclear weapon. It might have been complicit in the September 11th attacks. We could win a war there. But while the suspicions remain somewhat cloudy, the implications of such an attack are very concrete: billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of troops, displeasure from our Allies, and hostility from the Arab world.

PMOs tried to bring about a more favorable emotional climate by pressuring the media and Congress to be more critical of the Bush administration’s claims. The WILPF (August 6, 2002) asked the following of readers:

Please call your Senators’ and Representative’s local offices immediately to express your alarm and opposition to this dangerous expression of military madness. . . . Letters to the President and to the editor and calls to radio and tv stations are also important. Monitor media propaganda and respond.

By enhancing the credibility of their challenges, the mainstream media’s eventual critical coverage of Bush administration claims in this regard further encouraged PMOs to go on the discursive offensive (Peace Action, “A Growing Voice for America’s Conscience”):

The American public is growing more willing to confront our current reality, and resist governmentally imposed threats to freedom and peace. The President’s wartime immunity has clearly waned, and in its place we’ve rediscovered a national political consciousness that was lost in the fog of war and anxiety. The growing dissent—in print, on television, and at political rallies—targets everything from post-9/11 domestic legislation to the Bush administration’s war on terrorism.

Widespread media coverage of the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib by U.S. troops provided an additional opportunity to reverse the source and target of threats constructed by the dominant discourse. After noting that “CBS broadcast images showing Iraqi prisoners being tormented by their U.S. captors,” the CAIR (May 4, 2004) called on readers to demand a Congressional investigation. As the salience of the dominant threat discourse diminished, support for the administration’s policies waned. Directly in reaching the public and indirectly by pressuring the mainstream media to become more critical of the administration’s policies, peace movement discourse likely contributed to the weakening of the emotional components of hegemony.
Conclusions

Because emotions contribute to legitimating the rule and policies of power holders, social movements must respond to the emotional dimensions of the dominant discourse if they are to be effective in generating mass dissent. Like movement discourses in general, the emotional work of movements is dialogical. Through their speeches and writings, activists endeavor to defuse, block, or draft off of the potency of the dominant discourse. Each of these responses poses dilemmas that encourage multivalent, hybridized oppositional discourses.

On one hand, our findings suggest that ideological coherence and consistency do not translate into discursive rigidity. PMOs rapidly altered their discourses in response to the 9/11 attacks. With the onset of the Iraq War, PMOs’ discourses began to revert to pre-9/11 patterns, reflecting and contributing to a further change in the emotional climate in the United States. On the other hand, the flexible, adaptive qualities of social movement discourse do not translate into ideological incoherence or contradiction. Over 15 years, PMOs consistently emphasized the threat posed by militarism to the well-being of persons outside the United States.

Social movement discourses, therefore, appear to be contextually adaptive within the boundaries of ideologically adherence. There are both expressive and strategic reasons for this. Consistently high levels of challenging responses to the emotional work of power holders reflect the negotiation of oppositional identities as well as efforts to bring about long-term social change by raising oppositional consciousness. High levels of harnessing responses during specific historical moments constitute a mixture of expressions of emotions shared with most of the general public and attempt to counteract the potency of the dominant discourse.

The emotional work of power holders can, over time, lose potency and even become self-defeating. The extension by the Bush administration of threat discourse produced during the 9/11 period to military intervention in Iraq provided the peace movement with opportunities to undermine the potency of the dominant discourse by challenging its empirical credibility and experiential commensurability. PMOs questioned the existence of weapons of mass destruction and called on the media and Congress to be more critical of the Bush administration’s claims. In turn, groups in our analysis were further emboldened to intensify their challenges when they perceived increasingly critical media coverage and the declining popularity of the administration’s policies. Privileged access to mass communications does not guarantee that power holders will succeed in legitimating their policies in the eyes of mass audiences.

Our conclusions are based on a longitudinal analysis of U.S. peace movement discourse. Subsequent research on other social movements can help ascertain the external validity of the findings reported here. In addition, although our study offers evidence of the influence of power holders, journalists, and public opinion on U.S. peace movement discourse, it does not establish a reciprocal influence. We suspect that the ideologically adherent yet contextually adaptive qualities of its discourse...
assist the peace movement in reaching hearts and minds in the general public. Consistently emphasizing how militarism endangers human rights and civil liberties should assist in the formation and reproduction of an oppositional emotional culture where often highly organized expressions of feelings directly challenge dispositions promoted by power holders. At the same time, adapting discourse to the emotional climate may help to broaden the appeal of the movement’s message at a given historical moment. By linking the movement’s unpopular policy critiques to emotional norms and to those emotions that were extensively shared, we believe that peace activists have gained traction and created space for dissent even in the inhospitable political context in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Notes

1. Richard Gregg (1935/1966) was the first nonviolence theorist to apply the principles of physical jiu-jitsu to the realm of ideas and morals. Although Gregg called this “moral jiu-jitsu,” we think that the harnessing of power holders’ emotional work is better thought of as “emotional jiu-jitsu.”

2. We have collected a large set of data. Although we may utilise specific parts of that data set in different research articles, on the whole the data was collected, coded and analyzed in similar ways across our various research papers. It therefore seems reasonable to write parts of the methods sections of our different papers in similar ways. Consequently, some of the language in this methods section has also appeared in the methods sections of our earlier publications that are based on parts of the same larger data set (Maney, Woehrle and Coy, 2005; Coy, Woehrle and Maney, 2008a; Coy, Woehrle and Maney 2008b; Woehrle, Coy and Maney 2008).

3. For a discussion of how the coding scheme was developed, see Maney, Woehrle, and Coy (2005).

4. A list of the codes and their definitions is available upon request.

5. Difference of means tests also indicate that the amount of threat framing was significantly less during the “no fly zone” bombings of Northern Iraq. We attribute this finding to the relatively small amount of media coverage and public awareness of the conflict relative to the other periods.

6. The figures in Table 1 are for data limited to the 5 PMOs for which we have statements in all five conflict periods. An analysis of statements from 10 PMOs issuing statements in both the 9/11 and Iraq War periods indicates that the frequency of passages constructing threats to persons living in the United States during the Iraq War was 56.8% of the 9/11 period amount.

7. A telephone survey of 900 registered voters conducted by Fox News in early March 2004 reported that 58% of respondents felt safer today than before 9/11. Only 23% reported feeling less safe.

8. Ethnic cleansing presents the only instance that we were able to identify of PMOs harnessing the dominant discourse with regard to threats to persons outside the United States. PMOs appropriated the language of ethnic cleansing during the Kosovo conflict to a far greater extent than the other four periods.

9. Much of this paragraph also appeared in Maney, Woehrle & Coy, 2005.

References


Rhyming hope and history: Activists, academics, and social movement scholarship (pp. 222-238). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.


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